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Abstract
In this paper we build a framework where the interplay between the
lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority
of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up
to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition as well
as to cycles in aggregate expenditures and in real exchange rates.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the last decade, there has been a great progress on the understanding
of the mechanisms by which lobbying aﬀects economic outcomes (Grossman
and Helpman 1994, 1996, 2001). In this literature, special interest politics and
elections are linked through campaign contributions. Those are provided by
lobbies in exchange for a tilted economic policy in favor of the interests they
represent.
Another older strand of the political economy literature, the political busi-
ness cycle literature, relates electoral cycles on macroeconomic variable to either
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1partisan (classical references are Hibbs 1977, and Alesina 1987) or opportunis-
tic motives (e.g. Nordhaus 1975, Lindbeck 1976, Cukierman and Meltzer 1986,
Rogoﬀ and Silbert 1988, Persson and Tabellini 1990, and Rogoﬀ 1990), both
unrelated to lobby activity of groups.
While the lobby activity of special interest groups is often associated with
microeconomic policy, and its macroeconomic impact is thought to be negligible,
the political business cycle models explain cycles on aggregate macroeconomic
variables. In this paper we propose a framework in which the inﬂuence of
lobbies impact macroeconomic variables that have a distributive eﬀect in society,
generating electoral cycles in those variables.
In the simple framework we propose, opposite interests divide the society
in two groups: one with lobby power1, and the other with the majority of
votes. Government policy may aﬀect the distribution of resources in the society
between those two groups. The lobby group oﬀers the policymaker personal
beneﬁts for a tilted policy in its favor, which is interpreted as corruption, as
further discussed below.
This approach can explain cyclical variation of several macroeconomic vari-
ables around election (e.g. budget variables, inﬂation, nominal and real ex-
change rate). It is further motivated by the empirical evidence provided by Shi
and Svensson (2006). They ﬁnd that corruption and rent seeking indicators are
positively related to the size of the electoral ﬁscal cycle. They also ﬁnd that
the ﬁscal balance election year deterioration is only statistically signiﬁcant for
the group of developing countries. However, when controlling for corruption
and rent seeking indicators, the electoral ﬁscal cycles are no longer related to
development. The evidence that corruption and rent seeking activities are the
relevant variables to explain electoral cycles is consistent with our model, but
1By lobby power we denote the capacity to inﬂuence policy decisions for reasons unrelated
to the number of votes of the group.
2not with the traditional political business cycle ones.
In our proposed framework, electoral cycles are generated by the interplay
between political inﬂuence of a special interest group and the voting power of
the majority of the population. The mechanism behind the cycle is engendered
by the incumbent trying to signal that she has not been captured by the special
interest group, biasing her policy in favor of the majority of the population
before election.
We consider deals that are informal agreements, where the policymaker bi-
ases policy to beneﬁt the lobby group and, in return, is compensated later on.2
For example, former policymakers are often chosen to integrate the supervisory
board of large corporations. Such deals are not self enforcing, hence they de-
pend on a repeated relationship between the policymaker and the lobbyist, in an
environment where some agents interact in several instances over time, possibly
while performing diﬀerent roles.3
It is, then, reasonable to assume that it may fail to be implemented. That
is, with some probability the deal is implemented and the policymaker receives
the agreed upon amount, but there is some probability the deal falls apart,
resulting on an adverse outcome for the policymaker.4 We think of the success
probability of a deal as depending on factors such as how well the lobby and the
policymaker know each other, how much they trust each other, and what other
relations and connections they have between them.
2In the special interest literature, such as Grossman and Helpman (1994 and 1996), the
policymaker ﬁrst receives the campaign contributions from the lobbies and then implements
the agreeded upon policy. Here, the policymakers receive illegal or unethical personal beneﬁts,
which should be hidden from the public. As the policymaker is subject to more intense media
scrutiny while in oﬃce, her compensation is more likely to be given later on.
3This dependence of repeated interactions to enforce a deal is a wider phenomenon, perme-
ating the economic relations in economies where the formal institutions are not well developed
(see Dixit 2004).
4This adverse outcome may be explained by the deal may becoming public, resulting in an
election defeat, as in the variant of the model developed in Appendix A. Another possibility
is that the unsuccessful deal is not revealed to the public but the policymaker dislikes being
betrayed.
3The voters do not observe the success probability of a deal between the
lobby and the incumbent because they are not aware of all connections between
them. Neither they observe whether a deal between them was set. They can
not perfectly infer that information either, for we assume economic policy is
observed with noise.5
The median voter would like to pick the politician with less connections with
the lobby, since it will be more likely that she will not set a deal with the lobby
after election. To increase her reelection probability, in the period before election
the policymaker close to the lobby has an incentive to disguise her proximity.
She does so by choosing a policy less favorable to the special interests group than
the one she would choose if there were no reelection concerns. Analogously, the
policymaker far from the lobby, on her turn, will tilt her policy in favor of the
majority group to signal her distance. This behavior generates policy variables
cycles around election.
The model generates an additional cycle, which is a “contracting” cycle
around elections. Since reelection concerns induce the policymaker to favor
less the special interest group, the mutual net gains from a deal between the
incumbent and the lobby are reduced before elections. Therefore, it is less likely
that the policymaker will make a deal with the lobby before elections than after
elections.6
This setup has several applications. With regard to the overall government
budget, the distribution in the population of the beneﬁt of government expenses
net of the costs of taxation is unequal. For several countries, it is plausible to
assume that the ﬁscal situation is such that the large majority of the population
would beneﬁt from an increase in government expenses. A smaller group, for
5This assumption is consistent with Downs (1957) analysis, according to which an indi-
vidual voter does not have the incentive to spend resources to get informed, since she cannot
aﬀect the election results.
6This is in contrast with speciﬁc interests lobbying activity where politicians are rewarded
with campaign contributions reward in exchange of microeconomic policy biases.
4which the cost would exceed the beneﬁt, would have an incentive to organize
themselves to lobby for lower taxation. According to our approach, the result
would be a budget cycle around election, which, depending on institutional
details, could yield either a simultaneous increase in expenses and taxation or
an increase of the ﬁscal deﬁcit before elections. This is consistent with the above
mentioned evidence in Shi and Svensson (2006).
When the public expenditures are speciﬁc to groups in society our model is
able to generate electoral cycles in the composition of government expenditures.
This is in line with the recent empirical evidence of electoral cycles on the
composition of the ﬁscal budget (on Canada, see Kneebone and McKenzie 2001;
on Mexico, see Gonzalez 2004; on Colombia, see Drazen and Eslava 2005a).
Our model can also be applied to explain real exchange rate cycles around
elections. Movements in the exchange rate have a distributive impact, favoring
citizens whose income is positively related to prices of tradable goods in detri-
ment to citizens with income linked to nontradable prices. In countries where
the nontradable group entails the majority of the population while the tradable
group has lobby power, one could expect to see more appreciated exchange rates
before than after elections. There is strong empirical evidence of this type of
cycle in Latin American countries (see Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein, 2001, and
Ghezzi, Stein and Streb, 2004, for cross-country evidence, Bonomo and Terra,
2001, Grier and Hernández-Trillo, 2004, and Pascó-Fonte and Ghezzi, 2001, for
Brazil, Mexico and Peru, respectively).
Our model has some distinctive features. The association with lobbies is
politically costly to the incumbent. In this respect, it diﬀers from the special
interests politics literature. Here, setting a deal with the lobby jeopardizes her
reelection chances instead of improving it, as in that literature. This diﬀerence
stems from the type of policy variable the lobby aims at in the two contexts.
The special interest politics literature explains the impacts of lobbying on mi-
5croeconomic variables. The level of such variables has less widespread eﬀect
over the populations. Hence it should not impact signiﬁcantly election results.
There are three dimensions in which our model departs from previous po-
litical business cycle models. First, the key tension is on the distribution of
resources between two groups in society: one with the lobby power, and the
other with the voting power. This allows us to generate cycles not only in the
level of macroeconomic variables that have distributive impact, but also directly
in distributive variables.
Second, the incumbent’s motivation for being reelected is the possibility
of receiving personal beneﬁts for favoring the lobby after elections, which will
depend on her policy choice. Hence, we have built in an endogenous rent from
being in oﬃce, instead of resorting to the usual exogenous ‘ego rents’.
Third, it mixes adverse selection and moral hazard features. The ﬁrst gen-
eration of PBC rational models, initiated by Rogoﬀ and Silbert (1988) and
Rogoﬀ (1990), is characterized by hidden information about the policymaker’s
competence, who chooses an action to signal her type. In equilibrium her type
will be revealed. An unappealing feature of these models is that only the most
competent incumbent distorts policy.
A more recent generation of PBC models proposes a moral hazard frame-
work to handle this problem (e.g. Lohmann 1998, Persson and Tabellini 2000,
and Shi and Svensson 2002). They propose a simple twist in the adverse models:
the incumbent chooses her action before knowing her own type. This assump-
tion impels both types of incumbents to choose the same policy. Although the
incumbent’s action is not observed by the electorate, the observed economic out-
come ends up revealing her type as it is determined by the interaction between
her competence and the chosen policy. Those models generate the desired result
- in equilibrium both types distort policy-, at the expense of an unappealing one
- both types choose the same policy.
6In our framework, diﬀerent types of incumbents choose diﬀerent policies,
as in the adverse selection models, and distort policies before elections, as in
the moral hazard models. The main departure from adverse selection models
driving our results is that policy is observed with noise. This assumption yields
the incentive for both types to distort policy, as the incumbent’s type can never
be perfectly inferred by the voters.
This feature has some important implications. One advantage of a noisy
signal is that a large range of results is consistent with the equilibrium strate-
gies, each one leading to a diﬀerent belief on the incumbent’s type. Then, the
equilibrium does not depend on the arbitrary speciﬁcation of out of equilibrium
beliefs, which is common in signaling models. Moreover, we do not need to
assume an exogenous popularity or ‘looks’ shock to make the election result
uncertain, as in the adverse selection models.
Other models relate to this paper in generating cycles in distribution of
resources. In Bonomo and Terra (2005), an exchange rate cycle distributes
income between tradable and nontradable sectors. Voters are unsure about the
weight given to their group in the policymaker’s preference, and observe policy
with a noise. Exchange rate cycles around elections are thereby generated. In
Drazen and Eslava (2005b), voters suﬀer from the same information asymmetry
with respect to the incumbent’s preferences but are also uncertain about how
sensitive is their group’s voting behavior to government expenditures. The
result is a cycle in expenditure composition. Another alternative model of cycle
in the expenditure composition is provided by Drazen and Eslava (2005a), where
policymakers preferences are formulated in terms of types of expenditures.
We start by developing the basics of a simple but general framework in
the next section. In section three we solve the optimal policy problem under
lobby inﬂuence in a one period setting. The dynamic problem is studied in
section four. In section ﬁve we provide three applications to the model. In
7the ﬁrst one, presented in more detail, government chooses the composition of
expenditure between the two groups. In the second application, we generate
political budget cycles by assuming that increase in government expenditures
beneﬁt the majority of the population, while the lobby group is hurt when
taxes are increased. Finally, we have an exchange rate model, engendering real
exchange rate cycles around election, when we associate the tradable sector to
the lobby while the nontradable sector is assumed to have the voting power. In
this context, the policy variable is the real exchange rate level. The last section
concludes.
2M o d e l S e t u p
Society is divided into two groups. One group, which we call people, is the
majority (proportion n of the population, n>0.5), and deﬁnes the elections
outcome. The other group is organized and eﬀective in lobbying for policies
that favor their interests.
Government chooses an economic policy, which, for convenience, we model
as a strictly positive variable g. This policy aﬀects utility of the two groups
in opposite directions. Let vi (g) be the indirect utility function of a citizen of
group i, i = p (people),l(lobby), when the policymaker implements policy level
g. Without loss of generality, we assume that the people beneﬁtf r o mh i g h e r
values of g, whereas, for the lobby, the lower the g the better. That is, v0
p (.) > 0
and v0
l (.) < 0.W ea l s oa s s u m evi (.) to be concave.
We assume that the welfare function of a benevolent policymaker is utilitar-
ian:
U (g)=nvp (g)+( 1− n)vl (g), (1)
hence she would optimally choose:
g∗ ≡ U0−1 (0). (2)
8We add the possibility that policymaker receives some personal beneﬁtf r o m
the lobby in exchange of a policy choice favoring this group. We extend the
lobby and policymaker preferences to contemplate this more complex interaction
between them. Now, the policymaker’s utility depends not only on the direct
impact of his policy choice g on the groups’ utilities but also on the personal
beneﬁts and losses that may result from his interaction with the lobby group.
The personal beneﬁts she may receive from the lobby, c(g), depends on the
distortion of policy in favor of this group. More speciﬁcally, we assume that she
is able to take hold of a portion B from the net gain she creates to the lobby
group by distorting policy in its favor, that is:
c(g)=B (1 − n)[vl (g) − vl (g∗)]. (3)
This can be interpreted as being a result of a Nash bargain, where B depends
on the bargaining power of the policymaker vis-a-vis the lobby group.7
As discussed in the introduction, we think of those deals as informal agree-
ments where the policy is chosen ﬁrst and the personal beneﬁts will be received
in the future. Therefore, it is possible that the policymaker does not receive
the contribution, since such deals are not self enforcing. The probability that
the policymaker will receive the agreed upon beneﬁt later on depends on factors
such as extent of their repeated interaction, on the ability of the policymaker
to punish the lobbyist in other dimensions. We take these connections between
the lobbyist and the policymaker as exogenous, and determining the probability
π that the deal is successful. This probability will be the source of the informa-
tion asymmetry between the policymaker and the median voter in the dynamic
setting.8
7One may argue that, once the policy is chosen, the lobbyist has all the bargaining power.
However, we think of this bargaining as being determined by the repeated interaction between
the policymaker and the lobbyist along their lives.
8The variable that determines the type of the policymaker could be bidimensional, depend-
ing not only on the probability of a successful deal, but also on the bargaining power of the
policymaker. For simplicity we ignore this extra dimensionality.
9When the policymaker does not receive the agreed upon beneﬁts h ei n c u r s
in a reduction of X in her utility, instead of an increase of c(g). We interpret
this as an emotional cost from being deceived. An alternative interpretation
is that, when the deal falls apart, it is revealed to the public. This revelation
changes the policymaker’s reelection probability, which, in this case, leads to a
loss incurred in case of a broken deal. We explore this venue in Appendix A.
The policymaker chooses ex-ante whether to set a deal with the lobby group
to distort policy in its favor or not so as to maximizing her utility function,
which in this particular situation can be represented by:
W (g,I,π)=nvp (g)+( 1− n){vl (g) − IπB[vl (g) − vl (g∗)]} +
+I {θπB(1 − n)[vl (g) − vl (g∗)] − (1 − π)X},
where I is a indicator function that equals 1 when the policymaker set a deal
with the lobby group and zero otherwise. The equation can be written as:
W (g,I,π)=U (g)+I {πb[vl (g) − vl (g∗)] − (1 − π)X},( 4 )
where b ≡ (1 − n)(θ − 1)B.
3 One period problem
Let G be the optimal policy level chosen by the government if there were only
one period, with no election concerns. We derive the optimal policy choice under
ad e a l( I =1 ) and when no deal is set (I =0 ). The optimal contracting decision
is the one that yields the policymaker the highest utility.
In this one period setting, the optimal policy choice when there is no deal
with the lobby is that of the benevolent policymaker, that is, G = g∗.
The optimal policy level when there is a deal between the policymaker and
the lobby is deﬁned by:
g# =a r gm a xW (g,1,π),












Proposition 1 The policy choice under a deal with the lobby favors the lobby
group to the detriment of the people when compared to the utilitarian policy,
that is, g# <g ∗. Furthermore, the policymaker will favor more the lobby group




Proof. Using equation (2), we have that Wg (g∗,1,π)=πbv0
l (g∗) < 0.S i n c e
W (.) is concave in g, g# <g ∗. Using the implicit function theorem in the ﬁrst






l (g#) < 0.
The incumbent will choose to set a deal with the lobby, distorting the policy,
if her welfare under the deal is higher than the one when there is no deal. That











= W (g∗,0,π) (6)
deﬁnes the probability π for which the incumbent is indiﬀerent between setting
or not a deal with the lobby.
It is easy to see that the left hand side of equation (6) is increasing in π,
while the right hand side is independent of π.T h u s ,π is a cutoﬀ level such that
the government sets the deal with the lobby whenever π ≥ π.
We can summarize the results above in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For given values of n, X and b,t h e r ei sac u t o ﬀ probability π,
0 < π<1,d e ﬁned implicitly in equation (6), such that the incumbent will set a
deal with the lobby if, and only if, π ≥ π.
11If π<π,t h e ng = g∗.
If π ≤ π,t h e ng = g# <g ∗,w h e r eg# is deﬁned implicitly in equation (5).
4 The dynamic problem
In this section we solve the dynamic problem, where there is an election at every
other period. The main features of our story can be told in a simpler and clearer
two-period setup, with an election between them. In Appendix B we sketch a
more general multiperiod framework to show the results obtained in the two
period set up described in this section would still hold.
The success probability of a deal π is the source of information asymmetry
between the policymaker and the median voter. We assume that there are two
types of policymakers, f and c,w i t hπf <π c,r e ﬂecting the connection strength
between the policymaker and the lobbyist.9
T h o s ec o n n e c t i o n sa r el i k e l yt ob ep e r s i s t e n t ,s i n c et h e ya r ef o r g e di na
long-run relationship between the incumbent and the lobbyist. However, the
deal is established by individuals in government and lobby key positions. The
assignment for those positions may change, even over the same mandate. In
order to capture those features in the simplest way we assume the types to be
randomly assigned to the politician in the period before election from a Bernoulli
distribution, with Pr(π = πf)=p and Pr(π = πc)=1− p.10
4.1 After election problem
Since the after election period is the last one, there is no signaling component
in the government’s policy decision then.11 In this case, the proposition 2 for
9In our notation, f stands for "farther from the lobby" and c for "closer to the lobby".
10A popular alternative used in the literature is to assume that the policymaker’s speciﬁc
characteristic is determined by a MA(2) process, as, for example, in Rogoﬀ (1990). This
would generate equilibria with four diﬀerent policy choices for the government at each period,
unecessarily complicating the analysis.
11Note that it is also true that there is no signaling component in the government’s policy
decision after election in the multiperiod setting, since there is a new draw for the policy-
12the static problem still applies.


















+1 are, respectively, the after election optimal expenditure and
decision of having a deal with the lobby or not for policymaker of type j, π is
deﬁned implicitly in equation (6), and g# in equation (5). Since πc >π f,f r o m
Proposition 1 we have that Gc
+1 ≤ G
f
+1 ≤ g∗. Thus, we established that after
elections the policy maker closer to the lobby will distort more the policy than
the farther type.
4.2 Pre-election problem
4.2.1 The voter’s problem
We assume that the government policy is observed with a noise. Speciﬁcally,
w ea s s u m et h a tt h ep e o p l eo b s e r v et h ev a r i a b l eb g,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
b g = geυ,
where υ is a Gaussian shock with mean zero and variance σ2.T h i s c a n b e
rationalized as resulting from voters’ rational inattention.12
We also assume that the people do not observe the policymaker’s type π.
Hence, voters will try to infer π, given the observed policy. There will be a
signaling game between the incumbent and the voters.
The median voter, not belonging to the lobby group, would like to vote for
the policymaker who will choose a policy more favorable to the people after
election. It is clear from Proposition 1 that this will be the policymaker farthest
from the lobby, πf. Since there is no information about the opposition, it is
maker’s type in between elections.
12Citizens have limited information capacity and they have several other decision problems
to solve that depend on information. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, as a result, they
will be imperfectly informed about most of the relevant variables. See Sims (2003) for some
applications of rational inattention to economic problems.
13assumed that the probability of it being far from the lobbyist is equal to the
unconditional probability.
The median voter chooses her candidate by comparing the (updated) prob-
ability of the incumbent being of type πf to that of the opponent. As the
opponent is not in power, it is assumed that the probability that she is of type
πf is equal to the unconditional probability p. Thus, if the updated probability
about the incumbent’s type is larger than p,p e o p l ew i l lv o t ef o rt h ei n c u m b e n t ,
and she will be reelected. Otherwise the opponent will win the election. If
the updated probability is equal to the unconditional probability, we assume
that the incumbent is reelected with probability 1
2.L e tρ be the median voter’s





inc, if ρ > p
opp, if ρ < p
inc with probability 1
2 if ρ = p
.
How do voters form their belief ρ? Given the lognormality assumption for the
noise, any level of observed policy could result from any given policy. Therefore,
every positive level for the observed policy is in the equilibrium path. The
median voter’s belief ρ is generated by the updating of his prior belief p over
the incumbent’s type using Bayes’ rule:
ρ =P r( πt = πf |b gt = b g)= (8)
=
p × f(b gt = b g|πt = πf )
p × f(b gt = b g|πt = πf )+( 1− p) × f(b gt = b g|πt = πc)
,
where b g is the observed policy level, and f(.|.) is the conditional density function
of b g given the policymaker’s type. The voter will vote for the incumbent, that
is ρ>p , if and only if:
f(b gt = b g|πt = πf ) >f(b gt = b g|πt = πc). (9)
This rule is intuitive. The voter revises upwards his prior that the govern-
ment is of the distant type if, and only if, the observed policy level is more likely
14under the distant type’s policy than under the policy chosen by the type closer
to the lobby.
4.2.2 Reelection probability
Now we can calculate the incumbent’s reelection probability as a function of the
chosen policy level. To do so, it is necessary to specify the incumbent’s actions




which will be used by the voter to update his beliefs.
A chosen expenditure level g and a noise υ will determine the observed
policy level, b g = geυ. Therefore, the conditional density function of b g given the
policymaker’s type, f(.|.), is equal to the density function of the noise υ that
would yield b g when the policy level is the one chosen by this type in equilibrium.
That is,
f(b gt = b g|πt = πi)=φ
µ




where φ is the density of the standard normal distribution. Figure 1 illustrates
the density function of the observed policy, for a given policy chosen.
Figure 1: Observed policy density function
15Figure 2: Policy Cutoﬀ Level
Then, we can write the conditions for reelection in equation (9) as:
φ
µ









In the case of a separating equilibrium, with Gf >G c, the policy has a cutoﬀ
level g, such that, whenever the observed policy level is larger than g (b g>g),












which, due to the symmetry of the normal distribution, is:






Figure 2 depicts the density functions of the observed policy when the policy
level is the one chosen by each type of incumbent in equilibrium, πf and πc.T h e
ﬁgure also shows the cutoﬀ level of the observed policy g. Note that condition
(11) is satisﬁed for b g>g.
16Figure 3: Probability of reelection
For a chosen policy g, the reelection probability, q (.), is the probability that




≡ Pr[b g>g]=P r[ geυ > g]=
=P r [ υ>lng − lng],










where Φ(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function. The reelection prob-
ability is increasing in g, and it is greater than 1
2 if, and only if, g>g.F i g u r e
3 illustrates the probability of reelection for a chosen policy level g and for the
two types of incumbent equilibrium strategies, Gf and Gc, which determine g.
Suppose, alternatively, that there is a separating equilibrium with Gc >G f
(we will see in section 4.3 that this equilibrium is not possible). Then, since
13More precisely, the probability of reelection is equal to the probability of the observed
expenditure being strictly greater than the cutoﬀ level plus half the probability of the ob-
served expenditure coinciding exactly with the cutoﬀ level. However, under our continuous
distribution assumption, the latter probability is zero.
17voting is prospective, the median voter will still prefer the policymaker further
away from the lobby, although she will choose a lower policy level before election.
As a consequence, the inference problem is reversed, and the probability of










Now q is decreasing in g,s i n c eal o w e rg increases the probability that the
incumbent is of the distant type.
Finally, in the case of a pooling equilibrium, we have always ρ = p.T h u s ,
the probability of reelection is 1
2 and will not be aﬀe c t e db ya n yd e v i a t i o nf r o m
equilibrium strategy.
Then, we can summarize the dependence of the probability of reelection



















, if Gf <G c
1
2 if Gf = Gc
, (12)






4.2.3 The Incumbent’s Strategy









+1 is the expenditure and Ii
+1 is the decision of setting or not a deal
with the lobby, optimally chosen after elections by the reelected incumbent of
type πi (refer to section 4.1). Note that:
FW(πi) ≥ U (g∗), (13)
since it is always possible to the policymaker not to make a deal with the lobby
and to choose policy level g∗. Moreover, the policymaker will be strictly better
18oﬀ being reelected if her proximity to the lobby enables her to get rents from
being in power.
When the incumbent is not reelected her utility will be the benevolent one,
s i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tt h e r ei sn oa d d i t i o n a ls o u r c eo fp e r s o n a li n c o m eo rl o s so f
reputation when the policymaker is not in oﬃce. Alternatively, we can motivate
this speciﬁcation by assuming that the policymaker will become a member of
the majority group with probability p and a member of the lobby group with
probability 1−p.L e tFU be the expected after election utility of the incumbent,













Since the policymaker will have no rents when she is not reelected, the best
outcome for her is to have the new incumbent setting the socially optimal policy
level g∗. When at least one of the opposition possible types chooses to set a deal
with the lobby, an assumption we make,14 her policy choice yields the defeated
policymaker a lower utility compared to that resulting from g∗,t h u s :
FU <U(g∗). (14)
Combining equations (13) and (14), we have that:
FU <FW(πi). (15)
This last inequality implies that the policymaker always strictly prefers to
be reelected. Note that the beneﬁt from being in power is generated by the
potential deal between the policymaker in power and the lobby. Since this
beneﬁt will depend on the policy implemented, it is endogenous. The diﬀerence
14As we argue in section 4.3, after elections the incentives are more favorable to a deal. If
we assume functional forms and parameter values such that no deals are set after elections,
the model will generate only an uninteresting pooling equilibrium with the utilitarian policy
g∗ chosen before and after elections.
19FW(πi) − FU has the same role as the exogenous “ego rents” from being in
power extensively used in the political economy literature.
In equilibrium, the two decisions - the policy level and whether to set a deal



























and where β is the incumbent’s discount rate and the function q is given by
equation (12).









which makes clear that a higher reelection probability increases the utility of
the incumbent whenever it is advantageous for at least one of the types to set a
deal with the lobby after election.
Whenever reelection increases utility, the incumbent policymaker will choose
a policy which will depart from the static optimal level, which maximizes only
W(g,πi,I). As we will show below, the only type of equilibrium consistent with
this possibility has Gf >G c.T h i s m a k e s q increasing in g (equation (12)),
and the optimal level of g higher than the static one for both types. As the
after election policy choices coincide with the static optimal choices, there will
be policy cycles around elections, with policy favoring more the people before
20elections than after elections.15
4.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium requires a ﬁxed point in the solution of the incumbent problem
(16). That is:

















A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies, when it exists, should
satisfy the following conditions:
1. After election, an incumbent of type j will choose to set a deal with the
lobby whenever her type satisﬁes: πj > π,w h e r eπ is deﬁned implicitly
by equation (6). She sets policy level g# (which is implicitly deﬁned by
equation (5)) if she has a deal with the lobby and g∗ (deﬁned by equation
(2)) otherwise;
2. Before election, an incumbent chooses whether to set a deal with the lobby
and the policy level so as to maximize her expected intertemporal utility
function, that is, to solve problem (16), where the probability of reelection
function, q(g,Gc,G f), is given by expression (12);
15Formally, we have that
∂W(Gj
+1,πi,I)






























[FW(πi) − FU] > 0.
213. Before election, the policy level chosen by each type of policymaker is a
ﬁxed point, that solves problems (19) and (20), respectively.
We assume that the parameter values are such that the type closer to the
lobby beneﬁts from a deal with the lobby after election. This will produce an
equilibrium with the following features. First, it must be the case that Gf >G c,
since an equilibrium with Gf <G c is not possible.16
Second, there will be policy cycles around elections, that is, the policy favors
more the people before elections than after. More precisely, whenever it is
advantageous to at least one of the policymaker types to make a deal with the
lobby after elections, there will be electoral incentives that stimulate a policy
more favorable to the poor before election than after for each policymaker type.
The third feature is that a deal between the policymaker and the lobby is
more likely to happen after election than before. More speciﬁcally, whenever
an incumbent of a certain type makes a deal with the lobby before election,
she will also do it after election, but the converse is not true. A deal with
the lobby is proﬁtable for the incumbent only if the policy favors substantially
that group. However, election concerns induce the policymaker to set a policy
more favorable to the people, reducing the gain of an agreement with the lobby.
Therefore an agreement with the lobby is less likely before elections.
There is no guarantee that a pure strategy equilibrium exists. The model
may not have an equilibrium if the type closer to the lobby beneﬁts only mar-
ginally from a deal with the lobby after election. The argument is outlined in
Appendix C. However, a parameter conﬁguration which leads to no equilibrium
is not plausible in the context of the present model. The model relies on the pos-
sibility of deals between the policymaker and the lobby, and on non-observable
16As the type πc has higher rents from being reelected, his chosen policy before election will
be more distorted to increase his reelection probability. As the reelection probability function
would be decreasing in g in this case, before election the type πc would choose a policy level
actually lower than that of type πf, leading to a contradiction.
22comparative advantages of certain types to beneﬁt from those deals. Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that those deals beneﬁt substantially, rather than mar-
ginally, the policymaker that have access to them (the closer type, πc) under
the most favorable conditions to them, that is, after elections.
5A p p l i c a t i o n s
5.1 Government expenditure cycles
5.1.1 Expenditure composition cycles
There is evidence of electoral cycles on the composition of the ﬁscal budget in
several countries (on US, see Peltzman 1992; on Canada, see Kneebone and
McKenzie 2001; on Mexico, see Gonzalez 2004; on Colombia, see Drazen and
Eslava 2005). We now show how the framework developed above can be applied
to generate such electoral expenditures composition cycles.
In the simple formulation we choose the budget is always balanced, taxes
are ﬁxed and there are two types of public goods, speciﬁct oe a c ho ft h et w o
groups. The government budget constraint is represented by:
τ =( 1− n)gl + ngp,
where τ are taxes per capita that are uniform over the population, gl and gp
are expenditures for the lobby and for the people, respectively (all per capita).





The utility function of a citizen of group i, ui,i sr e p r e s e n t e db y :
ui (ci,g i)=ci +l o ggi,f o ri = p,l,a n dα>1,
17Note that, in this case, it is economically reasonable to impose an upper bound for gp
(0 <g p ≤ τ
n)t op r e v e n tan e g a t i v ev a l u ef o rgl. However, this new restriction is never binding
in equilibrium.
23where ci is her private consumption, and gi is the amount of the public expen-
diture available to her group. Given that ci = yi − τ, indirect utility functions
may be written as:






vp (g)=yp − τ +l o gg, (22)
w h e r ew eu s eg ≡ gp for simplicity.
Substituting equations (21) and (22) into the utilitarian welfare function of
a benevolent policymaker, represented by equation (1), we get:






where y = nyp +( 1− n)yl is the average per capita income. The benevolent
policymaker would optimally choose:
g∗ = τ = gl, (24)
that is, all citizens would receive the same spending level.
The optimal spending level under a deal in a one-period setting, that is, the





Note that in this application we have an explicit solution for the spending level.
It is easy to check Proposition 1: g# <g ∗ and g# is decreasing in π.
The cutoﬀ probability π deﬁned by equation (6) now becomes implicitly
deﬁned by:
(1 − n + πb)log
1 − n + πb
(1 − n)
− (1 + πb)log(1+πb)=X (1 − π). (26)
Following the setup above, we are able to show that there will be an electoral
cycle in the expenditures composition, with more spending for the people before
than after election. We provide a numerical example to illustrate the model’s
ability to generate electoral cycles.
24Numerical example Table 1 presents examples of the three possible equilib-
rium types. The examples diﬀer in the value of the loss X due to an unsuccessful
deal with lobby, while the other parameter values are set constant at: πf =0 .25,
πc =0 .75, n =0 .7, b =0 .5, σ =0 .25, p =0 .5,a n dβ =0 .9 .T h e ﬁrst line
presents the results for a relatively small value for X, 0.01, which makes a deal
with the lobby always beneﬁcial to both types before and after elections. We ob-
serve that there is an expenditures cycle for both incumbent types, with higher
expenditures for the people before elections.18















0.01 0.9219 0.8206 0.8889 0.7273 1 1 1 1
0.02 1.0237 0.8122 0.8889 0.7273 0 1 1 1
0.2 1.0195 0.7832 1 0.7273 0 1 0 1
Parameter values:
n =0 .7,β=0 .9,b=0 .5,πf =0 .25,πc =0 .75,σ=0 .25
When we increase X to 0.02, we generate additionally a lobby activity elec-
toral cycle. Before the election, a deal with the lobby becomes not advantageous
to the type less connected with the lobby, despite being beneﬁcial after election.
In order to increase her reelection probability, the policymaker of this type
prefers to increase her expenditure to the people to a level above the optimal
one, distorting expenditure in a direction opposed to the lobby interests.
Increasing the damage of an unsuccessful deal further, to X =0 .2, will make
even an after election agreement with the lobby not beneﬁcial to the distant type
policymaker. However, the close type, having a higher probability of success in
the deal with the lobby, is still able to proﬁt from the agreement, before and
after elections. We still have an expenditure cycle, with the close type choosing
to set a deal with the lobby before and after election, and the distant type not
18As common in political business cycle models, a reverse cycle may happen, although with
lower probability, when a incumbent closer to the lobby looses the election for an opponent
of the other type.
25setting the deal at any time.
Finally, an increase of X to the point that prevents any deal with the lobby
(not presented in the table) will result in an not very interesting type of equilib-
rium. Both types choose to spend τ for both types of citizens, before and after
elections.
5.1.2 Aggregate expenditure cycles
Electoral cycles in aggregate expenditures can be generated by a simple change
in the model described above. Suppose that the people are not taxed and receive
the only public good. Indirect utility functions become:
vl (g)=yl − τ, and (27)
vp (g)=yp +l o gg. (28)
We still assume a balance budget: g = τ.






If she has a deal with the lobby, she will choose:
g# =
n







With information asymmetry about the two diﬀerent policymaker types, πc
and πf, as before, the model generates electoral cycles in aggregate expenditures.
This result is in line with the empirical evidence, as in Brender and Drazen
(2004), Shi and Svensson (2002a,b), and Persson and Tabellini (2002).19
19Note that the balanced budget assumption also generates a counterfactual electoral tax
cycle. In a more complex version of the model, we could assume, instead, that taxes are hard
to change and that any eventual budget imbalances could be ﬁnanced by government debt.
This setting would generate an intertemporally balanced budget equilibrium with electoral
bycle in expenditures and budget deﬁcits.
265 . 2 E x c h a n g er a t ec y c l e s
There is empirical evidence of exchange rate electoral cycles for Latin American
countries (cross-country evidence for Latin America is provided by Frieden,
Ghezzi and Stein, 2001, and Ghezzi, Stein and Streb, 2004, for Brazil, see
Bonomo and Terra, 2001, Grier and Hernández-Trillo, 2004, for Mexico, and
Pascó-Fonte and Ghezzi, 2001, for Peru). Bonomo and Terra (2005) presents
a model that generates real exchange rate electoral cycles, in a setting with
informational asymmetry over the policymaker’s preferences. Here we derive
t h es a m er e s u l ti nas i m p l e rm o d e lb a s e do nl o b b yp o l i t i c sp r o p o s e di nt h i s
paper.
Consider a endowment economy with two sectors: a tradable a nontradable
sector. The nontradable sector has the majority of the population, while the
tradable sector has the lobby power. All consumers are assumed to have the













where Ni and Ti are the amount consumed of nontradable and tradable goods,
respectively, and r>1.N o wl e te b et h et r a d a b l eg o o dr e l a t i v ep r i c e ,w h i c hi s
the real exchange rate. Deﬁne g ≡ 1
e. As expected, the indirect utility function
is decreasing in the real exchange rate for a citizen in the nontradable sector,




r EN, and (31)
vT (g)=( 1 + gr)
− 1
r ET, (32)
where EN and ET are the per capita endowment for the nontradable and trad-
able sectors, respectively.









The policymaker may choose to set a more depreciated exchange rate, g<g ∗
(which means e>e ∗ ≡ 1
g∗) in order to favor the tradable sector and get a share
of its gain. Proceeding as before, we ﬁnd that whenever there is an agreement















By assuming that there are two types of policymakers, πc and πf,i n f o r m a -
tion asymmetry engenders a mechanism by which exchange rate electoral cycles
are generated. The policymaker will choose a more appreciated exchange rate
before than after election.
6 Empirical Implications: Lobbying vs. Com-
petence
In this session, we compare the implications of our model to those of Rogoﬀ’s
(1990) framework, and relate them to the empirical literature. The two mecha-
nisms are not mutually exclusive, and have some similar implications. Therefore,
part of the empirical facts found in the literature could be explained by either
approach. However, some new empirical ﬁndings can only be accounted for by
our model.
The electoral cycles generated by competence signaling in Rogoﬀ’s model
are also generated by our lobbying model. The government expenditure cycles
20We implicitly assume that the government manipulates its expenditure level in nontrad-
able goods to make the chosen exchange rate consistent with equilibrium in both nontradable
and tradable goods markets. The government budget can be balanced intertemporally by a
ﬁxed lump sum tax on each citizen. Cyclical government budget imbalances are ﬁnanced by
foreign investors. For an example of a model where the relation between ﬁscal policy and
exchange rate is explicitly taken into account, see Bonomo and Terra (2005).
28around elections, traditionally modeled as a result of competence signaling can
also be engendered by our mechanism when the ﬁscal policy has a distributive
character (see section 5.1.2 above). Exchange rate electoral cycles have also been
modeled through the competence mechanism (Ghezzi, Stein, and Streb, 2006),
but are naturally modeled in our framework, as changes in the exchange rate
redistribute resources between tradable and nontradable sectors (see Bonomo
and Terra, 2005, and section 5.2 above).
Additionally, our model is able to generate distributive cycles, such as the
electoral cycle in government expenditure composition (see section 5.1.1). The
cycle should entail a pre-election increase in expenditures that beneﬁtt h em a -
jority of the population at the expense of a reduction in expenditures that favor
lobby groups. Competence based models may also generate government ex-
penditure composition cycles, but of a diﬀerent type. Visible expenses should
increase before election in detriment of those less easily observable.
Recent empirical studies have uncovered electoral composition cycles in gov-
ernment spending that is consistent with both models. In a cross-country analy-
sis involving 35 developing countries, Schuknecht (1994) unveils larger capital
expenditures before elections. Drazen and Eslava (2005) and Khemani (2004)
show similar cycles in country studies for Colombia and India, respectively.
Capital expenditure can be interpreted as spending that beneﬁts a large part
of the population, what makes this electoral cycle consistent with our model.
If the capital expenditures are made in visible items, it may also be consistent
with the competence model.
Our business cycle mechanism has some distinctive features, since it is based
on lobby and/or corruption activities. A necessary condition for our mechanism
to be relevant is that the country’s institutional environment does not prevent
those activities. There is evidence that lobby/corruption activities do happen
in numerous countries, beneﬁting ﬁrms involved in them. Faccio (2006), exam-
29ining a sample of 47 countries, ﬁnds that ﬁrm’s political connections are more
common in countries with less stringent regulation of conﬂict of interests, being
particularly common in countries that are perceived as being highly corrupt.
Furthermore, political connections are found to increase the ﬁrms’ value, cor-
roborating country speciﬁc evidence provided by Fisman (2001) and Claessens
et al. (2005) for Indonesia and Brazil, respectively.
Shi and Svensson (2006) oﬀer a more directly supportive evidence of our
mechanism. They investigate the existence of political budget cycles in a sample
of 85 countries, from 1975 to 1995. First, they use the entire sample and found
that the ﬁscal balance deteriorates in election years. When they split the sample
in developed and developing countries, the cycle appears only in the developing
countries sample. Finally, using one country level indicator of corruption and
another one for rent seeking activities they ﬁnd that those two indicators are
signiﬁcantly related to the budget electoral cycle. Furthermore, controlling for
those indicators, the development dummy does not signiﬁcantly alter the cycle.
The results indicate that corruption and rent seeking are positively related to
the size of political budget cycles. The earlier evidence that those cycles were
related to the development of the country were due to the correlation between
corruption and rent seeking, on one side, and the level of development, on the
other.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we propose a mechanism by which lobbying may generate political
business cycles. We build a framework where the lobby power of an economic
group interacts with the voting power of the majority of the population, leading
to political business cycles. The model generates an additional cycle, which
is a “contracting” cycle around elections. Since reelection concerns induce the
30policymaker to favor less the lobby group, the mutual net gains from a deal
between the incumbent and the lobby are reduced before elections. Therefore,
it is less likely that the policymaker will make a deal with the lobby group before
elections than after elections.
We showed that those same ideas could be applied to generate cycles around
election in other economic variables, such as government expenditures level, and
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e .
The mechanism we propose in this paper does not exclude the operation of
traditional political business cycle channels, as proposed by the opportunistic
and partisan literature. However, the evidence provided by Shi and Svensson
(2006) that political business cycles are stronger in countries with higher cor-
ruption and rent seeking indicators does suggest that our proposed mechanism
may be indeed important. The relative importance of our proposed channel
in explaining the electoral cycle in diﬀerent variables should be investigated in
future research.
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Appendix A: When an unsuccessful deal is revealed to the public
In this appendix we drop the assumption that the incumbent incurs in an
exogenous utility loss when her deal with the lobby is not successful. We assume,
instead, that an unsuccessful deal is revealed to the public. In this case, the
policymaker’s loss from an unsuccessful deal will be due to the eﬀect of this
revelation on her reelection probability.
The policymaker preferences are now represented by:
W0 (g,I,π)=U (g)+Iπb[vl (g) − vl (g∗)], (36)
where b ≡ (1 − n)(θ − 1)B.
34In this model, both types of incumbent will choose to make a deal with
the lobby after election, as there is no penalty from an unsuccessful deal. The
optimal after election policy chosen is also implicitly deﬁned by equation (5).
Before election, the incumbent will take into account the eﬀect of the chosen
policy on her reelection probability. Here we will restrict our analysis to the
case in which there exists an equilibrium where, before election, the incumbent
closer to the lobby chooses to make a deal, while the other type does not.
Now the voter observes, not only the policy (with noise), but also whether
there was an unsuccessful deal. Let ρj be the voter’s updated belief that the
incumbent is of type πf,a f t e ro b s e r v i n gb g and whether an unsuccessful deal oc-
curred or not (Ix = j with j =1when the deal is unsuccessful and 0 otherwise).
Formally:
ρj =P r( πt = πf |b gt = b g,Ix = j)
If an unsuccessful deal occurs, the voter will infer that the policymaker type
is πf. Therefore ρ1 =0 , and the incumbent will not be reelected.
The updated belief when the voter receives no signal of an unsuccessful deal
is:
ρ0 =
p × h(b gt = b g,Ix =0|πt = πf )
p × h(b gt = b g,Ix =0|πt = πf )+( 1− p) × h(b gt = b g,Ix =0|πt = πc)
,
(37)
where h(b gt = b g,Ix =0|πt = πi) is the joint density of observing a policy signal
b g and receiving no information about an unsuccessful deal, given the incumbent
type is πi.
It is clear that:
h(b gt = b g,Ix =0|πt = πc)=πc × f (b gt = b g|πt = πc), and (38)
h(b gt = b g,Ix =0|πt = πf )=f (b gt = b g|πt = πf ),
since the success of the deal is assumed to be independent of the policy chosen
35by the incumbent when the incumbent makes a deal with the lobby.
When the voters receive no information about an unsuccessful deal, the
incumbent will be reelected if ρ0 >p , which, after substituting equation (38)
into (37), can be seen to be equivalent to:
f (b gt = b g|πt = πf ) >π c × f (b gt = b g|πt = πc).
Given the assumed lognormal distribution for the noise, the cutoﬀ for the







The reelection probability for an incumbent which chooses a policy g and
whether to set a deal I can easily be shown to be given by:
q0 ¡
g,I,Gf,G c¢








Note that the reelection probability decreases when the incumbent chooses
to make a deal with the lobby.







Observe that, when I =0 ,V0 (.) becomes the same function as in the original
problem. However, this does not mean that Gf w i l lb et h es a m ea sb e f o r e ,s i n c e
it depends on Gc. The closer type faces a diﬀerent objective function, as the
reelection probability is a diﬀerent function of g.
Appendix B: A multiperiod framework
Here we sketch the problem in a multiperiod framework. The main modi-
ﬁcation is in deﬁning a value function for the incumbent problem and solving
36it by dynamic programming. Instead of breaking the value function into one
period pieces, as usual, here it is appropriate to break it into two-period pieces.
Let Y (πi) be the value function for the type i. T h e nw eh a v eap a i ro f
Bellman equations:


















[pY (πf)+( 1− p)Y (πc)] for i = f,c
w h e r ew ea s s u m e dt h a to n c et h ei n c u m b e n tl o o s e st h ee l e c t i o n ,s h ew i l lb ea
regular citizen forever.















for i = f,c
The term between square brackets represents the gain from being reelected,
and we will show that it is strictly positive and greater than the rents from
being reelected once, FW(πi) − FU >0.I tc a nb er e w r i t t e na s :
FW(πi) − FU+ β
∙





In order to evaluate the term between square brackets, note that:
Y (πi) ≥ U (g∗)+β
FU
1 − β
for i = f,c,
since in the ﬁrst period the incumbent is in charge and g∗ is in her policy
choice set. As for the continuing utility, if she is not reelected, she will get
FU thereafter. If she is reelected, her continuing utility is greater than FU,a s
s h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 ) .












for i = f,c.
which implies:




Hence, this result renders the incumbent a gain greater than FW(πi)−FU
from being reelected. Thus, the incentives for getting reelected are even higher,
leading to more pronounced cycles, in this multiperiod setting.
Appendix C: Conditions under which there is no pure strategy
equilibrium
The model may not have an equilibrium if the type closer to the lobby
beneﬁts only marginally from a deal with the lobby after election. The argument
is outlined below.
Let the parameters be such that the policymaker of type πc opt for a contract
after election but for no contract before. As we will argue, this happens when
0 <π c − π<ε ,f o ras u ﬃciently small positive ε,w h e r eπ is the probability
cutoﬀ level deﬁned by equation (26). In this case the incumbent of type πc
chooses to make a deal with the lobby after election and distorts policy. Thus,
FW(πj) >F Ufor both incumbent types, that is, they strictly prefer to be
reelected. For this reason, both incumbent types have an incentive to distort
policy to increase their reelection probability. Assume that, in equilibrium,
Gf >G c, so that the reelection probability is increasing in g (by equation
(12)). The policymaker of type πc will face a conﬂict of incentives between a
policy which leads to a higher probability of reelection - a higher g -a n dap o l i c y
which will lead to higher personal beneﬁts - a lower g.H o w e v e r ,f o ras u ﬃciently
low ε the deal with the lobby after elections is only marginally advantageous
38to her, so that the additional electoral incentive makes a deal with the lobby
before election not advantageous. It is clear that the incumbent of type πf will
have even less incentives to set a deal with the lobby before elections, since
she faces a higher probability of a bad outcome. Hence, neither incumbent
types set a deal with the lobby before election. Their diﬀerent incentives in
the pre-election policy choice comes from their diﬀerent electoral incentives.
Since FW(πc)−FU >FW(πf)−FU, the policymaker of type πc will have a
higher reelection gain, therefore she will make a higher eﬀort to be reelected by
choosing a higher g.T h a ti s ,Gf <G c, which contradicts our initial assumption
that Gf >G c.
An equilibrium with Gf <G c is not possible either, since in this case the
probability function will be decreasing in g and the type πc will choose a lower
policy level than πf. Then, the only remaining possibility is a pooling equi-
librium, with both types choosing policy level g∗. However, this cannot be an
optimal choice for type πc, since in this case the incentives the policymaker faces
before election are the same she does after election, when she chooses to have a
deal with the lobby.
39